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Various less developed countries and newly industrialized countries use financial 
regulation as an instrument for industrial policy. Based on a theoretical analysis, this 
paper provides empirical evidence for South Korea on how foreign banks compete in a 
regulated environment and how competition changes with deregulation. Overall, the 
results show that foreign banks had a limited but positive impact on financial 
development. In terms of market performance foreign banks were found highly efficient 
although foreign banks' market shares decreased under deregulation. While foreign 
capital inflows finally led to a financial crisis, the lion's share of these funds was lent by 
domestic banks to loss-making Korean corporations. Thus, from a policy point of view 
it is more reasonable to give foreign creditors the freedom to allocate credits directly to 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
Various developing countries have seen their financial system as an instrument for 
industrial policy. Consequently, regulations in these countries were mainly directed to 
influence banks and other financial institutions in order to allocate funds into specific 
economic sectors rather than to maintain solvency of financial intermediaries and 
stability of the financial system. The major results of this policy were institutionally 
weak intermediaries, flourishing crony-economics, high non-performing loans, and 
finally a tendency towards a banking crisis. Thus, economic development was more 
damaged than promoted. A vast amount of literature has already been written about 
government's impact on financial intermediation and recommends a reduction of 
government influence.1 However, not all liberalizing countries really succeeded: 
Several countries suffered financial instability and withdrew reforms. Obviously, the 
main cause for liberalization failures was an inadequate sequencing of the reform 
process (Fischer/Reisen 1992). Frequently, freedom in business and market entry was 
given to financial institutions before or – even worse – without establishing a system of 
qualified banking supervision and strengthening the financial system institutionally (e.g. 
changes in banks' management and a reduction of non-performing loans).  
One aspect of liberalization hardly investigated so far is how foreign banks may 
contribute to an upgrade of the financial systems' performance.2 Foreign direct invest-
ment in the industrial sector has been proved to be an adequate mechanism for support-
ing economic development. For many newly industrialized countries economic success 
started when foreign direct investment was liberalized. This may also be true for the 
entry of foreign banks. The following analysis will investigate this question. Of course, 
it cannot serve as a final answer on how foreign banks contribute to financial and 
economic development. Instead, a case study will be presented that gives insight into 
the activities of foreign banks in a financial system which experienced decades of 
repressive regulations with a cautious reduction of government influence over time: 
Target of the investigaton is the case of foreign banks in South Korea.3  
                                                 
1  For an excellent overview see Fry (1995).  
2 An early analysis that dealt, among other things, with foreign banks, is the well-known work of 
Goldsmith (1969, pp. 360ff.) about financial systems' development. He emphasized the importance of 
foreign banks for developing a financial system by pointing out that outside of Europe and North 
America the development of financial systems was widely based on foreign banks. The focus of later 
studies were the determinants of foreign banks' presence: Empirically, a relationship was identified 
between foreign companies' direct investment and both presence and market shares of foreign banks 
for various industrialized countries (Goldberg/Saunders 1981, pp. 17ff.). A similar influence is seen 
for trade (Budzeika 1991, pp. 14ff.; Hondroyiannis/Papapetrou 1996, pp. 207ff.). For developing 
countries, Sabi (1988, pp. 440ff.) identified a relationship between US-Banks' activities and US-
companies' presence but no impact of trade. Contrary, Marashdeh (1994, pp. 113ff.) found a 
relationship between foreign banks' presence and trade in Malaysia while foreign direct investment 
had no influence according to that analysis.  
3  This paper summarizes the main results of a comprehensive investigation of foreign banks in South 




The analysis consists of two sections. In the first section, the regulation environment in 
the Korean financial system will be described and analyzed theoretically with regard to 
its impact on foreign banks' activities. In the second section, several aspects of foreign 
banks will be investigated: Entry motives, activities in the credit markets over time, 
influence of regulation and deregulation, preferred market segments, competition, and 
indicators of market performance like solvency, profitability and productivity. The 
analysis is primarily based on the evaluation of a questionnaire-investigation conducted 
in 1995. In this survey, 24 of 25 questioned foreign banks and 11 domestic – nationwide 
commercial – banks4 gave answers concerning various aspects of their activities.5 The 
24 foreign banks held approximately 70 per cent of all foreign banks' assets in South 
Korea at time of questioning; the 11 nationwide commercial banks represented nearly 
90 per cent of all nationwide commercial banks' assets. Thus, the analysis will provide a 
good review of foreign banking in South Korea compared to domestic banks. The 
period investigated ends shortly before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997, but 
the difference in efficiency of foreign and domestic banks in South Korea will 
illuminate the major causes for the crisis. In the final conclusion, implications regarding 
how to overcome the weaknesses of banking in South Korea will be presented.  
II.  FINANCIAL BACKGROUND IN SOUTH KOREA: ANALYSIS OF THE 
REGULATION ENVIRONMENT  
There are only a few countries that experienced a similar dynamic growth in the recent 
economic history. Even compared to other Asian countries South Korea's economic 
development is impressive. However, the recent events have revealed weak spots in the 
economic system and especially in financial intermediation.6 One of the major critical 
aspects in South Korea's economic development, an important cause for the final crisis 
and a bottleneck for future development, is that financial development lags far behind 
economic development, this can be seen in an international comparison of "financial 
deepening" – measured by financial assets relative to GDP (see Table 1). In fact, South 
Korea's financial institutions are less developed in mobilization of savings and ineffi-
cient in credit allocation – the latter can be observed especially in practices of bribery 
and cronyism by bank managers. This weakness in financial intermediation was caused 
by decades of repressive regulation, which used intermediaries for industrial policy in a 
non-competitive environment.  
                                                 
4 Two of these nationwide commercial banks were mainly in domestic hands but had also foreign 
owners. Thus, in the later analysis of the questionnaire they are indicated as joint-ventures (JV).  
5  The questioning was realized under the assistance of South Korea's central bank: The Bank of Korea 
sent the questionnaire to both foreign and domestic banks but without influencing the questions and 
without getting any insight into the results of the questioning. Only a single foreign bank and no 
domestic bank refused to answer the questionnaire.  
6  For a comprehensive and critical description of South Korea's economic development before the out-





Financial deepening in several Asian countries in 1997 
Moneya/GDP 
(in per cent) 
Financial sector's claims on 
private sector/GDP 
(in per cent) 
Japan   73,8  114,2 
Singapore   67,4  100,7 
South Korea   40,0  73,4 
Malaysia   69,8  103,9 
Indonesia   44,5  60,9 
a Broad money as defined by IFS (International Financial Statistics) ("quasimoney").  
Source: International Monetary Fund (1999).  
Financial intermediation is very diverse in South Korea. The Korean financial system 
includes nationwide commercial banks, regional banks, specialized banks, branches of 
foreign banks (located in the cities of Seoul and Pusan) and various nonbank-financial 
institutions. This structure has grown since the early 1960s. After the military coup in 
1961, a new government under General Park Chung-Hee ordered the nationalization of 
the few already existing (nationwide) commercial banks and the building of further 
financial institutions: Specialized banks for the whole country and regional banks for 
each Korean province were founded, and in 1967 the entry of foreign banks was 
allowed for the first time since the end of the Japanese occupation. Moreover, some 
nonbank-financial institutions were built – a process that accelerated in the beginning of 
the 1970s and received further boost in the 1980s.  
The magnitude of using the different kinds of financial institutions varied in the past; 
however, none of these institutions was really free of government influence. Nationwide 
commercial banks, which were allowed to do business throughout the country but are 
still based mainly in the large cities, became the main credit source in the financial 
system. They were completely state-owned and controlled by government officials. 
Thus, nationwide commercial banks allocated funds into specific sectors and companies 
according to state priorities. During the 1960s and 1970s this resulted in a huge and 
excessive credit flow to large conglomerates (the "jaebol"). As far as there was an 
opportunity for independent allocation, bank managers strove for personal advantages 
(bribery and crony-activities). Compared to nationwide commercial banks, regional 
banks enjoyed more independence in selecting customers and setting conditions, but 
regional banks remained restricted to their province and concentrated business on small 
and medium-sized companies. Specialized banks served as development banks and, 
consequently, were directly bound by government orders. Specialized banks were 
founded for different target groups (e.g. export, small and medium-sized companies, 
housing, fishing, agriculture and forestry). Nonbank-financial institutions entailed a 
large spectrum of intermediaries and their instrumentalization was similarly diverse. For 
example, state-owned investment institutions were nothing more than government's 




merchant banks certainly were restricted to their specific business but in this area 
relatively free.  
Foreign banks had a special function and, therefore, a special regulation status, too: On 
the one hand, they could not do business in such areas as trust or retail banking; on the 
other hand, they were relatively independent of government orders when channeling 
funds into specific companies at special rates. The main instrument for controlling 
foreign banks' market share and capital import was a swap-policy. Each foreign bank 
had a quota (swap-contingent) which allowed a limited import of foreign capital and 
exchange into the Korean currency "Won". By this swap-policy, the Bank of Korea 
offered foreign banks a special margin (swap-margin) for their swap-contingent that 
implied a generous profit. Thus, even in times of relatively low – regulated – domestic 
interest rates (compared to international markets), foreign banks' capital transfer to 
South Korea was lucrative. Other sources of refinance, however, were highly restricted. 
During the 1960s and 1970s there was no real access to the Bank of Korea's rediscount 
facility and it was not allowed for foreign banks to have more than one branch in Seoul 
(since 1978 one further branch could be founded in Pusan). Thus, refinancing like 
domestic banks through retail business was not possible.  
Apart from these regulations on foreign banks' business, competition in the financial 
system was suppressed in several ways. Firstly, restrictive entry barriers protected exis-
ting banks and other financial institutions from new competitors. Between 1973 (when 
the foundation of regional banks was completed) and 1981 (when the first private-
owned nationwide commercial bank was built) only foreign banks' entry could cause an 
increase in the number of market participants in the banking sector. Secondly, market-
segmenting restrictions regarding business areas and customer groups for the different 
financial institutions limited competition among banks and especially between banks 
and nonbank-financial institutions. Finally, regulations on interest rates existed for both 
savings and credits and thus prevented real competition.  
It began in 1981 and was at least partly the consequence of a short but deep recession in 
connection with the political crisis of 1979/80 (after President Park's assassination) 
when the government carefully started a reform process in the financial system. The 





Major deregulation measures in the financial system since 1981 
until the outbreak of the financial crisis 
Year   Deregulation measure  
1981  The privatization of nationwide commercial banks begins.  
  Licenses for new private-owned nationwide commercial banks were granted.  
1981-1984 Abolition of credit controls (limits on credit volumes for individual banks) and reduction 
of minimum reserve requirements (during the 1960s and 1970s one of the major mone-
tary policy instruments).  
1984  Certificates of Deposit (CD's) were introduced for domestic banks (two years later also 
for foreign banks) – a first step towards the liberalization of interest rates.  
  Partial liberalization of interest rates by allowing margins within interest rates to be set 
freely by banks.  
1985  Reduction of swap-margins and swap-quotas for foreign banks (several further 
reductions followed during the next years).  
Foreign banks received limited access to the Bank of Korea's rediscount window.  
Restrictions that excluded foreign banks from trust business were relaxed.  
Since  1985  Several deregulations regarding the capital account liberalized international capital 
transfer (but dependent on the current account situation there were repeatedly re-regu-
lations for capital account transactions).  
1986  Foreign banks' access to the Bank of Korea's rediscount facilities was extended.  
1987  Derivatives were introduced.  
1988  Different interest rates were liberalized (this reform was annulled just a few months 
later).  
  Foreign banks received the permission to build more than one branch in both Seoul and 
Pusan, to open branches in other cities and the allowance to do business with individuals 
(retail banking).  
1991-1997  Announcement and implementation of a four-step-plan to liberalize interest rates (apart 
from demand deposits all interest rates were deregulated until 1997).  
1993  A so-called "real-name-system" was introduced that prohibits the holding of bank 
accounts under pseudonyms.  
Despite these reforms, various restrictions remained: Regulations that repressed capital 
account transactions, minimum credit-quotas for banks' business with specific cus-
tomers (especially minimum credit-quotas for small and medium-sized companies), the 
regulation of interest rates on demand deposits, and different market segmenting 
restrictions on business areas for intermediaries. Moreover, informal government 
influence on intermediaries' market behavior replaced formal regulations. Especially 
banks still served as "agents of development" for the government when in November 
1997 the financial crisis became obvious.  
For the supply of financial funds in South Korea the inflow of foreign capital was 
essential in the past, because apart from a short period between 1986 and 1989 the 




and record-deficits in 1995 and 1996. Foreign financial institutions – both institutions 
that operated from abroad and foreign banks that operated branches in South Korea – 
were an important mechanism to channel funds into the financial system. The figures 1, 
2 and 3 illustrate the potential impacts of such capital imports.7 In figure 1, this is 
analyzed for the case of regulated interest rates (with iregulated = AB). It is assumed that 
foreign banks do not mobilize domestic savings and operate completely with funds from 
abroad (which was the case in South Korea as long as foreign banks were highly restric-
ted in branching and retail banking). On the other hand, domestic banks attract funds 
only in the domestic market (domestic banks in South Korea were for a long time highly 
restricted in international business and, moreover, did not have the creditworthiness like 
foreign banks in international markets to attract funds). Consequently, domestic savings 
supply is domestic banks' credit supply (determined by Korean residents' savings) and 
foreign savings are imported and offered exclusively by foreign banks. Foreign banks 
do so under the prerequisite that the interest rate in the domestic (Korean) market 
(which was iregulated in times of interest rate regulation) plus the swap margin (granted 
to foreign banks by the Bank of Korea) is higher or at least equal to the international 
interest rate – formally:  
(1) iregulated + swap margin ≥ iinternational = AC.  
Without foreign banks' entry the credit supply is AD – as illustrated by figure 1. Thus, 
because of the regulation-induced credit demand AE a not covered excess demand of 
DE remains. The effects of foreign banks' entry are the following: Credit supply 
increases up to an amount corresponding to the AE-line with foreign banks' market 
share being DE/AE. As long as foreign banks do not attract funds in the domestic 
financial market, the market position of domestic banks (with the credit amount of AD) 
is not threatened by the foreign entrants, because the additional supply of funds will 
only meet the regulation-induced excess demand for credits. In fact, an excess demand 
for credits still remained in South Korea because the swap transactions for foreign 
banks were very limited and not sufficient to cover the complete excess demand for 
credits at the regulated interest rate. This reflects the situation of South Korea's financial 
system as long as interest rates were regulated and foreign banks excluded from 
attracting domestic savings and thus concentrated on international savings (which were 
transformed by the Bank of Korea-swap into Korean Won).  
                                                 
7  For the following graphic analysis it is assumed that there are no costs of intermediation. Thus, for 
perfect competition banks will offer credits at the interest rate for savings. Consequently, the supply 
curve for savings and the supply curve for bank credits are identical. A similar analysis as in figures 1 
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Figure 2 illustrates the efficiency (or inefficiency) of swap-policy applied to foreign 
banks in South Korea under the assumption of government-fixed interest rates (by regu-
lations or informal pressure on banks to keep interest rates low) with  
(2) iregulated = AB < iinternational = AC.  
Moreover, it is assumed that the competitive domestic interest rate for the closed finan-
cial system (no capital imports) is above the international interest rate:  
(3) idomestic competitive market = AD > iinternational = AC.  
As long as the domestic regulated interest rate is below the international interest rate, 
the efficiency of international financial intermediation could be raised by capital 
imports through foreign banks. Highest efficiency occurs in a market equilibrium with  
(4) idomestic = iinternational = AC,  
when savings according to AI are mobilized in the domestic financial system and 
savings of IL are taken from the international market (efficiency equilibrium). However, 
when capital import is not possible and interest rates are regulated (with AB) only an 
amount of savings AE could be mobilized in the domestic markets (while no inter-
national funds will be attracted) and an excess demand EN for credits remains. 
Compared to the efficiency equilibrium, inefficiency equal to the area FHMJ results. On 
the other hand, if the government would decide to deregulate interest rates domestically 
but keep the financial system closed for foreign funds, a – former – welfare loss FHK 
could be avoided but because of the absence of foreign funds a welfare loss JKM 




Now suppose that the central bank introduces a swap-policy by offering foreign banks a 
swap-margin that implies a price gain for them. A swap-margin that at least equals the 
margin between the (regulated) domestic interest rate and the interest rate in interna-
tional markets (iinternational −  iregulated = CB) is necessary to attract foreign savings. In 
this way, the former excess demand for credit can be completely met by foreign banks' 
capital import EN. Compared to the efficiency equilibrium, only inefficiency equal to 
FGJ plus MPO remains. FGJ represents the welfare loss arising from the import of 
foreign savings (at the international rate AC) which could be mobilized for less in the 
domestic market (if the domestic interest rate would not be regulated). Welfare loss 
MPO arises because the regulation-induced low interest rate causes a further demand 
for credits (LN) which does not represent a profitable investment under the market 
interest rate AC in the efficiency equilibrium.  
We can see in figure 2 that the swap margin CB is not only the minimum margin to 
attract foreign funds but also the most efficient solution to reduce inefficiencies caused 
by interest rate regulation through swap policy. Every swap-margin higher than CB 
would cause a capital import larger than EN and thereby inefficiencies larger than FGJ 
plus MPO. On the other hand, a swap-margin of less than CB would let everything be 
the same as before (which means an inefficiency FHMJ) because iregulated plus swap-
margin does not catch up with iinternational and, consequently, capital imports are not 
profitable.  
Thus, the lesson is: Obviously, swap-margins that serve as a subsidy to compensate 
foreign banks for the disadvantage of low regulated interest rates (iregulated  < 
iinternational) are potentially able to increase efficiency by attracting capital imports; 
nevertheless as figure 2 also shows, some inefficiency remains. This kind of 
inefficiency can be higher than the inefficiency that remains when the government 
accepts deregulated interest rates but prohibits foreign capital inflows. In the graphic 
example of figure 2 this is obviously not the case because the inefficiency caused by 
swap policy under interest rate regulation (FGJ+MPO) is not as high as the inefficiency 
(JKM) caused by prohibiting foreign capital inflows under a deregulated interest rate. 
However, also another constellation is possible.8 Definitively, highest efficiency can 
only be realized by deregulating interest rates and allowing foreign capital inflows.  
                                                 
8  In figure 2, this could be shown by shifting the line for the international interest rate (iinternational market) 
closer to the the line for the domestic competitive interest rate (idomestic competitive market). In this way, 


























In figure 3, the deregulation process has been implemented so far that interest rates are 
deregulated. Moreover, it is assumed that swap policy does not exist or at least does not 
matter because without regulation-induced low interest rates special swap-incentives are 
not necessary to attract foreign banks. However, because competition in the financial 
system is relatively weak – which characterized South Korea still during the mid-1990s 
as a result of regulation-induced market segmentation and regulated market entry – 
existing domestic banks can earn excess profits (or oligopoly profits). The 
(monopolistic or oligopolistic) interest rate is AD and the corresponding credit amount 
supplied by domestic banks is only AE.9 With increasing competition – that could be 
caused not just by foreign banks' integration but also by the entry of further domestic 
banks – the interest rate will be reduced to AC (with a corresponding credit amount AI) 
which causes an efficiency gain FGJ. Nevertheless, as long as domestic banks have no 
access to international financial markets at interest rate level AB, foreign banks have a 
stronger impact: They can import funds at AB and thus increase the domestic credit 
supply to an amount AI. The result is an additional efficiency gain corresponding to 
HJL compared to the situation of pure domestic competition without access to 
international markets (with an interest rate AC), and an efficiency gain FGLH compared 
to the initial situation of domestic credit market oligopoly (with the monopolistic or 
oligopolistic interest rate AD).  
                                                 
9  It is assumed here that by acting in collusion, banks in the oligopolistic market are able to realize the 




Figure 3  
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Figure 1 and 2 demonstrate theoretically how swap-policy influences credit supply and 
efficiency in a financial system when interest rates are regulated (or held low by 
informal government influence) – as it was practiced especially in the very early phase 
of South Korea's economic development. On the other hand, figure 3 analyzes theoreti-
cally the impact of foreign banks' activities in a more deregulated financial system – 
characteristic for the later phase of South Korea's economic development. However, the 
question for empirical reality is: Were foreign banks' activities really strong enough in 
South Korea to cause a significant impact on the credit markets? In section III this 
question is analyzed with empirical data.  
III.  FOREIGN BANKS' FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION  
In 1967 foreign banks were admitted to the South Korean financial system for the first 
time since the end of Japanese occupation after World War II. Thus, South Korea now 
looks back at a history of more than three decades of foreign banking. Initially, the main 
reason of the government for attracting foreign banks was to receive further foreign 
capital, but over time foreign banks' role changed and the import of foreign know-how 
became the focus of attention. The following section will start with the description of 
banks' entry (including entry motives) and the development of market shares (a). It is 
followed by the impact of deregulation (b), banks' sectoral activities (c) and other 
market performance indicators, especially with regard to bank efficiency (d).  
a)  Entry and market shares  
Foreign banks were part of the extension, which the government has pursued for South 




government to allow foreign banks' entry was to enlarge the access to international 
financial funds and thus financing the chronic current account deficit. Moreover, 
foreign banks were thought to increase the competitiveness of the domestic financial 
system, to attract foreign direct investment and to give Korean banks access to financial 
systems in countries which practiced the reciprocity principle for foreign bank entry 
(see Euh/Baker 1990, p. 8). However, in 1967 – the opening year for foreign banks – 
only a few branches started operation. Obviously, foreign banks were skeptical 
regarding South Korea's economic and financial development, but moreover, the 
government favored a strategy of slow market opening. The bulk of the 52 foreign 
banks that operated in South Korea during the mid-1990s took up business between 
1974 and 1985. Since the end of the 1980s, foreign bank entry has stagnated and began 
to decline in the 1990s – during this time, especially since 1995, several foreign banks 
closed their branches in Seoul or Pusan.  
In searching for the entry motives of foreign banks a clear change could be found over 
time. Table 3 indicates the results from the questioning of 24 foreign banks about their 
major motives for joining the Korean financial system. The majority of foreign banks 
built up branches in Seoul (since 1977 it has also been allowed in Pusan) in order to do 
business with Korean customers. However, at the beginning of the financial opening, 
several banks, especially Japanese, came primarily for doing business with companies 
from their home country that operated already inside South Korea. This changed during 
the 1970s, when Korean customers increasingly became the preferred business area for 
foreign banks, even for Japanese ones. Obviously, the South Korean economy became 
increasingly attractive for foreign banks over time, and thus their presence grew further. 
Moreover, an increasing current account deficit after the first oil crisis in 1973 
promoted foreign banks' activities (see figure 4a-c).  
Table 3 
Entry motives of foreign banksa 
 Doing  business 
with companies 
from a bank's 
home-country that 
operate in Korea  
Doing business 
with other foreign 
companies that 





All foreign banks   4  1  20  1 
From:          
USA and Canada   -  -  7  1 
Japan   3  -  3  - 
Europe 1  -  6  - 
Asia without Japan  -  1  4  - 
With year of entry:          
1967 – 1972  4  -  5  - 
1973 – 1985  -  1  11  - 
Since 1986  -  -  4  1 
a  Two banks named two major motives for entry. Consequently, the first row of table 3 sums up to 26 
(instead of 24).  




The current account had a strong influence on foreign banks' market shares. In figure 
4a, the development of foreign banks' market shares for all bank assets can be seen.10 
Figure 4b presents data concerning the growth of these market shares (in percentage 
points) in view of the current account deficit. Figure 4c sketches data about foreign 
bank growth of all assets compared to the current account deficit.  
Figure 4a 
Foreign banks' market shares  
 
Figure 4b 
Foreign banks' market share growth  
and current account deficit/GDP 
                                                 
10 Foreign banks' market shares in the domestic mobilization of savings is not presented here because – 
as a result of both rigid regulations regarding branching and, moreover, most foreign banks' strategy to 
concentrate on credit business – their activities in the mobilization of domestic funds remained mar-
ginal. Thus, refinancing in international markets and by the head-office of foreign banks in the home 
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Foreign bank asset growth and current account deficit 
    Source: Bank of Korea, International Monetary Fund. 
After a slow beginning, foreign banks' market share in all bank assets increased in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s and reached a top of nearly 11 per cent in 1985. Afterwards, 
their market share decreased significantly and almost continuously – a process that was 
stopped in 1994 and reversed in 1996 (see figure 4a). Until 1989 the downward trend of 
foreign banks' asset share (which began during the mid-1980s) can be led back to South 
Korea's current account. As a result of an export-oriented economic development and an 
increasing success mainly of jaebol in world markets during the 1980s, the current 
account deficit shrunk and in 1986 a large surplus occurred, the first ever since indepe-
ndence (except for a very small one in 1977). Thus, the situation for foreign banks had 
changed completely in 1986 and in the following years the market shares decreased – 
but foreign banks did not lose market volume because South Korea's financial system 
grew at extraordinary rates year by year.  
However, there was not just a changing current account in the 1980s. Moreover, 
motivated by deregulation, domestic banks began to expand their so far very limited 
overseas activities and gained access to international financial markets. Consequently, 
when South Korea returned to a current account deficit in 1990, foreign banks could 
initially not profit by increasing their market shares. Domestic banks were now able to 
attract the bulk of necessary foreign funds and, likewise, some Korean companies – 
especially jaebol – could borrow abroad, too. Thus, despite a current account that was 
almost continuously in deficit, foreign banks had lost market shares (see figure 4b) and 
began to close branches in both Seoul and Pusan. This continued till 1996 when the 
current account grew to a new deficit record (with a deficit record already in the year 
before – a sign for the approaching crisis). Foreign banks' asset share now started to 
increase again, but more moderately compared to the current account deficit. As figure 
4c indicates, a parallel can also be drawn for foreign banks' asset growth in absolute 
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The conclusion of this first subsection is that especially in the relatively early phase of 
economic and financial development in South Korea foreign banks' market shares 
depended for a great part on the current account deficit. With an increasing access of 
domestic banks and jaebol to international financial markets this changed partly, and 
thus despite growing current account deficits foreign banks lost market shares even in 
the 1990s. An influence of the current account on foreign banks' market share still 
exists. However, deregulation, which enlarged domestic banks' freedom for 
international activities, took away a part of the foreign banks' market. The impact of 
deregulation will be analyzed in detail in the following section.  
b)  Impact of deregulation  
Regulations are a crucial determinant for the structure and performance of each 
financial system. Consequently, deregulation in South Korea – as described in section 2 
– caused a serious change in the financial system, even when considering that various 
regulations remained. The impacts of deregulation were one aspect of the bank 
questioning.  
Table 4 shows deregulation effects on both foreign and domestic banks' activities and 
supports the thesis that foreign banks lost market shares in South Korea as a result of 
reduced regulations. While nearly all surveyed nationwide commercial banks (eight 
completely domestic banks and two joint-venture-banks) stressed an extension of their 
activities as a result of deregulation, foreign banks' consequences varied. 10 of 24 
surveyed foreign banks saw no difference for the size of their business, six banks 
reduced activities and only four banks extended activities because of deregulation.  
The decisive cause for this different behavior of foreign and domestic banks lies in the 
fact that in the era of repressive regulation foreign banks were mainly restricted to areas 
that they did not prefer anyway (e.g. retail banking, business in other cities than Seoul 
or Pusan). On the other hand, domestic banks – and especially nationwide commercial 
banks – were eager to do more business in international markets and in foreign 
exchange and could profit therefore from deregulation more than foreign banks. And a 
further fact matters. The deregulation process was not well balanced. Apart from 
government's still existing influence on domestic banks' customer selection (specific 
companies and sectors), domestic banks were freer than foreign banks to handle some 
specific financial products in the mid-1990s. For example, foreign banks were still 
restricted in doing trust business or getting access to the Bank of Korea's rediscount 





Impact of deregulation on foreign banks 
Did deregulation cause an extension or 
a reduction of bank's activities?  
Extension   Reduction   No significant 
difference  
Foreign banks   4  6  10 
Domestic banks   8 and 2 JV  -  1 
Source: Survey.  
Among the activities started or increased by domestic banks as a result of deregulation, 
international business plays an important role. Especially foreign currency lending be-
came increasingly important. Other new or growing business areas were an extension of 
retail business, derivatives, certificate of deposits (CD's) and various further specific 
financial products. Of the foreign banks some banks started business with private 
customers, CD's, custody business and other specific bonds. On the refinancing side, 
apart from CD's there was no compensation for the reduction of swap-transactions for 
foreign banks. This refinancing privilege (that was necessary to compensate foreign 
banks for regulated-low interest rates – see section II) was reduced step by step beginn-
ing in the mid-1980s, when the current account changed into a significant surplus and 
domestic banks received access to international credit markets. Foreign banks were no 
longer seen as an indispensable source for foreign funds. Thus, a reduction of foreign 
banks' market shares in credit business resulted.  
c)  Sectoral activities and competition  
As a consequence of long-term industrial policy South Korea was characterized by 
economic imbalances in terms of significant sectoral differences in the mid-1990s. On 
the one side there are the large jaebol that were successful exporters in their main 
product sphere.11 On the other side we find a vast number of small companies, much 
less competitive and frequently not able to offer the necessary intermediate goods for 
jaebol's export (a major reason for South Korea's current account deficit in the 1990s). 
To increase small and medium-sized companies' efficiency and competitiveness further 
investments – and consequently more credit – were necessary. Thus, the survey also 
aimed at differences regarding foreign banks and domestic banks in the sectoral 
allocation of funds. A clear difference was identified (see table 5).  
For domestic banks (nationwide commercial banks), Korean small and medium-sized 
companies were obviously more important as debtors than other groups (including large 
companies, the jaebol). On the other hand, for foreign banks the jaebol dominated fund 
allocation: 17 out of 24 surveyed foreign banks named jaebol as their main debtor 
group. However, for some foreign banks the financial system (other banks and non-
bank financial institutions) or foreign companies from banks' home countries (that 
operate in South Korea) were their main debtor. Although no Japanese bank named 
customers from their home country as their main debtor, especially Japanese banks still 
                                                 
11 As could be seen in recent years, there were also some weaknesses regarding the diversification strate-




had close ties with Japanese companies in the mid-1990s. Three out of the five surveyed 
Japanese banks allocated at least 20 per cent of all their funds to companies that 
originally came from their home country; a behavior that could be observed only for 
three non-Japanese foreign banks (out of 19 surveyed non-Japanese banks). Only one 
foreign bank allocated funds primarily to individuals. This was the US-American bank 
Citibank, which operates several branches especially in Seoul but also in Pusan. 
Citibank is currently the only foreign bank in Asia running a retail-business strategy. 
Domestic small and medium-sized companies played only a minor role for foreign 
banks. This was because foreign banks were relatively free to choose credit customers 
compared to domestic banks that were forced to follow government priorities. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the majority of foreign banks did so far not 
contribute to the reduction of inequalities in competitiveness and credit-access between 
the large jaebol on the one side and small companies on the other.  
Table 5 



















All foreign banks   17  - 5 2 1 
F r o m :           
USA and Canada   5  -  1  1  1 
Japan   3  -  3  -  - 
Europe    6  - - 1 - 
Asia without Japan   3  - 1 - - 
With  year  of  entry:          
1967 – 1972   5  -  3  -  1 
1973 – 1985   8  -  2  1  - 
Since  1986  4  - - 1 - 
Domestic banks   2  4 and 2 JV  -  -  1 
a  Both foreign and domestic banks – including two joint-venture-banks (JV) – were questioned about 
their main kind of debtor. The data in the table indicate how many banks had their main debtors in 
domestic large companies, domestic small and medium-sized companies etc.  
Source: Survey. 
Smaller differences between foreign and domestic banks have been identified for the 
fund allocation to economic sectors (see table 6). As most domestic banks, the majority 
of foreign banks allocated funds to the manufacturing industry (16 of 24 foreign banks – 
among them all European banks) but some other banks, especially American banks, 
were highly engaged in the trade sector. Financing private consumption was the main 
business area only for Citibank. However, Citibank's contribution to financing private 
households and consumption should not be ignored: Because Citibank was the largest 
foreign bank in South Korea during the mid-1990s (and still is today) and – as most 




consumption uses, Citibank was an important credit-source for private households and 
private consumption.  
Table 6 
Credit allocation of foreign and domestic banks: Main sectorsa 
 Manufactu-
ring industry  Trade Service  Private 
consumption 
Other 
All foreign banks   16 5 1 1  1 
From:           
USA and Canada  3  3  -  1  1 
Japan   4  1  -  -  - 
Europe   7  -  -  -  - 
Asia without Japan   2  1  1  -  - 
With year of entry:            
1967 – 1972  5  2  -  1  - 
1973 – 1985   9  -  1  -  1 
Since 1986   2  3  -  -  - 
Domestic banks   6 and 2 JV   -  -  1  - 
a  Both foreign banks and domestic banks – including two joint-venture-banks (JV) – were questioned 
about the areas they mainly financed. The data in the table indicate for how many banks the 
manufacturing industry, trade etc. represented the main sector for fund allocation.  
Source: Survey. 
The just noted importance of Citibank influences also the competition of foreign and 
domestic banks. The domestic banks were asked about foreign banks' competition in 
different segments of the financial system. Although most foreign banks did not engage 
in retail business, eight domestic banks (among them the two joint-venture-banks) felt 
foreign banks' competition in financing Korean individuals and private consumption 
(see table 7b and c) and confined these "foreign" competition explicitly to Citibank.  
Regionally, a competition of foreign banks existed for the majority of the surveyed 
domestic banks only in Seoul (see table 7a). Other cities – even Pusan – and especially 
rural areas were obviously not really touched by foreign banks' business. This cannot be 
attributed to former regulations which restricted foreign banks' presence to Seoul (and 
Pusan) because since the early 1990s branches can be established in South Korea 
relatively unrestricted; however no foreign bank (including Citibank) has opened a 
branch in another city than Seoul or Pusan.12 Even Pusan, where branches have been 
allowed since 1977, was no place to do business for the bulk of foreign banks or it was 
not any longer. In fact, during the early 1990s several foreign banks closed their 
branches in Pusan. Obviously, they preferred to confine their activities to South Korea's 
economic and financial capital Seoul.  
On the debtor side, sectoral competition of foreign banks was felt by domestic banks 
primarily for the segment of large domestic companies: Seven domestic and two joint-
venture-banks reported a competition with foreign banks in this market segment. 
                                                 
12  In the early 1990s, Citibank had plans to establish branches in other cities than Seoul or Pusan (see 




Competition existed also – but to a lesser extent – in other segments as tables 7b and 7c 
illustrate. That only six Korean banks (four completely domestic and two joint-venture-
banks) felt foreign banks' competition in the financing of foreign companies can be 
attributed to the fact that only a few domestic banks were engaged in this kind of 
business. Sectoral competition of foreign banks was highest for trade, the manufacturing 
industry, private consumption (as mentioned, this was caused by Citibank) and the 
service industry. It was low or almost insignificant for house construction, agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and mining.  
Table 7 
Foreign banks' competition with domestic banks in different market segmentsa 
a) Region  
Seoul   Other cities  Rural areas 
8 and 2 JV   3  1 




















7 and 2 JV   5 and 1 JV   4 and 2 JV  2   6 and 2 JV   2  4 
c) Sector  














7 and 2 JV   6 and 2 JV   6 and 2 JV  4 and 2 JV  1 and 1 JV  1  - 
a  The domestic banks (including two joint-venture-banks; JV) were asked in which market segments 
they felt foreign banks' competition. The data in the table indicate how many domestic banks reported 
a competition with foreign banks in the market segment named in the head row.  
Source: Survey. 
These results underline that in general foreign banks still had a significant impact on the 
financial system of South Korea at the time of the survey (1995) despite a decreasing 
market share since 1985. Nevertheless and despite different deregulations, since the 
early 1980s it has to be taken into account that until recently credit markets in South 
Korea were "seller's markets" – banks had no problems to find customers for their 
credits. Therefore, as a consequence of government's remaining influence, competition 
between banks was limited and foreign banks' competition was limited, too – even if 
their market shares would not have decreased since 1985.  
d)  Market performance  
The influence of foreign banks on the Korean financial system entails a potential for a 
more favorable, efficient and sound intermediation. This can be identified by investi-
gating different indicators of performance for both foreign and domestic banks (see 




allocate funds to non-profitable investments. These misallocations normally do not only 
reduce the efficiency of intermediation but also threaten intermediaries' solvency, and 
therefore can imply risks for the stability of the financial system. An indicator for this 
allocation inefficiency of banks (in absence of positive or negative spillovers for the 
credit-financed investments) and the risk of an instability of the financial system is the 
share of non-performing loans relative to all of the banks' assets.13 According to central 
bank data, foreign banks were burdened with non-performing loans to a much lesser 
extent than domestic banks throughout the 1990s (table 8 contains the data for 1996). 
However, it must be considered that these data do not illustrate the whole burden of bad 
loans. In fact, in the past especially domestic nationwide commercial banks had 
frequently undertaken cover-ups of balances and write-offs of non-performing-loans 
which resulted in low – and during the 1990s declining – shares of non-performing-
loans.14 This behavior was encouraged by the government, which had forced banks to 
reduce non-performing-loans but without reducing instrumentalization of these banks 
for industrial policy. Thus, apart from write-offs, purely cosmetic measures were used 
to whitewash bank balances. And despite these practices, even according to official 
central bank data presented in table 8, nationwide commercial banks and, moreover, 
regional banks were much higher burdened with non-performing loans than foreign 
banks. The financial crisis – which became obvious in autumn 1997 – confirmed these 
solvency problems of domestic banks.  
Empirically, the real problems for domestic banks and the better efficiency performance 
of foreign banks in South Korea were more obvious thanks to another indicator: Return 
on assets. Domestic banks (especially former state-owned nationwide commercial 
banks) had an extremely weak profit performance – mainly a result of frequent write-
offs of non-performing-loans. Among foreign banks, especially US-banks had a favor-
able profitability for almost the entire period they did business in South Korea and with 
an increasing distance to domestic banks during the 1990s. A similar favorable profi-
tability can be seen in 1996 for British banks. However, apart from a single foreign 
bank – which had a loss in 1996 – nearly all foreign banks enjoyed a better profitability 
than the "average" (domestic) nationwide commercial bank.  
                                                 
13  "It is when the private and social rates of return on investment projects coincide (i.e. when external 
economies or dis-economies of projects are negligible) that the proportion of non-performing loans in 
financial institutions can serve as an accurate indicator of allocative efficiency” (Akyüz/Kotte 1991, p. 
13).  
14 Thus, bad loans for nationwide commercial banks were much higher than 0,8 per cent of all assets that 
























  in per cent   in Mill. Won 
Former state-owned 
nationwide 
commercial banks   0,8c 0,08  1.727 1.285  62 
New nationwide 
commercial banks       1.808  1.376 59 
Regional banks   0,9  0,47  1.259  823  29 
Foreign banks   0,1  1,53  5.949  2.181  138 
From:          
USA  0,15  3,4 3.828  2.060  137 
Japan 0,01  0,7  12.520  3.886  242 
France 0,04  0,7  10.448  2.295  103 
United Kingdom  0,09  2,6  3.970  1.671  112 
Canada 0,02  1,1  4.233  2.208  82 
Singapore 0,57  0,9  5.029  1.632  103 
Australia 0,06  0,7  3.564  1.428  47 
Netherlands 0,00  0,8  6.617  1.847  119 
Other countries  0,09  1,5  3.899  1.295  109 
a In 1996; b) In 1994; c) Data was available only for all nationwide commercial banks.  
Source: Based on data of the Bank of Korea. 
There are different reasons for a higher allocation efficiency of foreign banks, but in the 
end all these reasons can be related to government influence on financial institutions (by 
direct business guidelines, the regulation-caused weak competition between banks and 
an implicit state-guarantee for the survival of domestic banks):  
-  Despite deregulation, in the mid-1990s a strong government influence on financial 
institutions and especially on domestic banks' credit allocation still remained. With 
this influence, funds were misallocated to an enormous extent and a large number of 
non-performing-loans resulted. It is true that there was a positive influence of finan-
cial regulation on economic development, too, because credits for private households 
were discriminated and, thus investment rates flourished.15 However, in all, a less 
state-influenced selection of investment projects would have been more efficient. In 
fact, as empirical analyses show, South Korea's economic growth record in the past 
was not a result of an efficient intermediation but caused by a huge accumulation of 
savings (Kim/Lau 1994), both national and foreign savings. Of course, foreign banks' 
                                                 
15 Discrimination of credits for private households had two positive effects on economic growth in South 
Korea. Firstly, more credit was directly available for investments in the industrial sector instead of 
consumption spending (although various of these industrial investments were inefficient). Secondly, 
because private households could hardly receive credits from banks they had no other choice than to 
build up own savings to finance their necessities (house construction etc.). Thus, similar to Japan and 




branches were not completely free of government influence on credit allocation (or 
implicit state expectations regarding market conduct) but constraints were more 
severe for domestic banks and, thus foreign banks' efficiency in intermediation was 
less damaged.  
-  In South Korea business is influenced by personal relationships (crony-economics): 
Common roots of business partners (e.g. family relationships, joint military service, 
studying at the same university or coming from the same city or province) play a 
significant role in business and can displace such factors as prices or quality of 
products. Consequently, also in South Korea's not very competitive financial system 
credits were frequently allocated to companies where bank managers had such 
relationships. For foreign banks, this form of credit allocation was less important. 
Firstly, because foreign banks' branches were supervised by headquarters in the home 
country, branch managers were primarily profit oriented. Secondly, foreign banks' 
branch managers were either foreign (mostly sent from the banks' home country) or 
Korean people who had spent some time abroad (for study or work). Thus, they were 
not as much integrated in the Korean society as managers of domestic banks. For 
foreign banks' managers, close relationships existed at best to managers of foreign 
companies, but this would mean a too limited market to make relationships a major 
criterion for allocating funds.  
-  Despite growing international activities, in the mid-1990s domestic banks in South 
Korea were still not as competitive as foreign banks with regard to their ability to 
evaluate creditworthiness (Aliber 1994, p. 347). As far as the credit allocation was 
not influenced by government-set priorities or personal relationships of bank 
managers mainly the existence of guarantees determined credit allocation. Compared 
to foreign banks, domestic banks failed in evaluating investment projects' expected 
profitability. Thus, even highly efficient investments failed to receive domestic banks' 
credit when no guarantee was available. This weakness in credit evaluation was 
favored by a (regulation-induced) low competition, which meant no pressure for 
banks to identify the most profitable investments (in order to be able to pay the 
highest interest rates in the mobilization of savings). Foreign banks, on the other 
hand, could fall back on staff from their international network (foreign or – 
increasingly – Korean) who learned and practiced banking (including credit evalu-
ation) in a more competitive environment.  
-  In case of financial problems, domestic banks could rely on central bank assistance 
for preventing insolvency. Until 1997, no troubled Korean bank was closed. This 
implicit guarantee for the survival of domestic banks made depositors unconcerned 
about the quality of these banks' credit management (Aliber 1994, p. 350). It gave 
managers of domestic banks not just the freedom to allocate credits according to 
personal relations (or bribery). Moreover, domestic banks' managers often ran a stra-
tegy that was more focussed on asset-growth than on profitability and efficiency 




able to prevent insolvency and branch managers in South Korea could not generate 
losses without risking their job.   
Further information on foreign banks' performance compared to that of domestic banks 
concerns productivity (see table 8). For these productivity indicators – assets, credit 
volume and operating profit relative to the number of bank employees – foreign banks 
again performed better. This was partly a result of foreign banks' focus on wholesale 
business, but it was also caused by a more rationalized financial intermediation – 
therefore, foreign banks' intermediation can be interpreted also as technically more 
efficient. Domestic banks were highly leveraged with excessive personnel. Like 
employees of jaebol, until recently the staff of Korean banks enjoyed the guarantee of 
life-long-employment regardless of the quality of their work and the banks' changing 
manpower requirements.  
Thus, it can be concluded that foreign banks were more efficient (in allocation as well 
as technically) and sound in terms of non-performing-loans, profitability and 
productivity compared to domestic banks.  
IV. CONCLUSION   
The case of foreign banks' financial intermediation in South Korea gives empirical 
evidence for what can be achieved by increasing foreign influence in a financial system 
that has to support industrial policy because of regulations. Several results were found:  
-  There was a change in entry motives of foreign banks. While at the beginning of the 
financial opening foreign customers from a bank's home country (that operated in 
South Korea at that time) had stimulated foreign banks' entry, since the mid-1970s 
doing business with Korean companies dominated as the major entry motive.  
-  Foreign banks' refinancing was concentrated on headoffice borrowings transformed 
by swap-transactions into Korean Won (swap-transactions were offered to foreign 
banks at special rates in order to compensate them for regulated low interest rates 
compared to interest rates in international fund markets). Foreign banks did scarcely 
mobilize domestic savings in South Korea. Thus, foreign banks' market shares had 
increased almost continuously until the mid-1980s when the current account was in 
deficit and foreign savings were in great demand. This changed with the first 
significant current account surplus in 1986 but partly also during the 1990s when the 
current account ran into deficit again: Foreign banks' market shares declined until 
recently because an increasing access of domestic banks and jaebol to international 
financial markets had become substitutes for foreign banks' lending.  
- Most foreign banks confined their presence and activities regionally to the capital 
Seoul – only a few foreign banks did limited business in Pusan. Foreign banks 
favored specific market segments like large domestic companies (jaebol) and avoided 
other areas (especially retail banking was no market for most foreign banks). 
Compared to domestic banks, foreign banks were more engaged in trade finance but 




-  However, foreign banks' market behavior was not uniform. Citibank is a special case 
because it started a retail banking strategy in the late-1980s and does until today most 
of its business with individuals (instead of companies like most foreign and domestic 
banks). Another exception were Japanese banks that had allocated a large number of 
credits to Japanese companies in South Korea.  
-  Domestic banks felt the competition of foreign banks in different market segments 
but especially in Seoul (kind of region), for large domestic companies (kind of cus-
tomer), for trade and the manufacturing industry (kind of sector). Nevertheless, the 
activities of Citibank (the largest foreign bank in South Korea) caused competition 
also in the credit allocation to individuals and for private consumption.  
-  Performance indicators revealed a higher efficiency of foreign banks' intermediation 
both in allocation and in technique. Here, foreign banks profited from being involved 
in industrial policy only moderately and from a more qualified staff that was not just 
better educated but also less integrated into personal relationships (which influence 
domestic banks' credit allocation). Moreover, domestic banks were burdened with 
excessive staff.  
It was in November 1997 when South Korea had to declare the inability to repay debt 
and to beg the IMF for financial assistance. The longstanding weakness of the regulated 
financial system now became obvious and could no longer be ignored by politics. 
Several nationwide commercial banks burdened with non-performing loans were not 
able to survive. The government forced mergers in the banking sector between more 
competitive and less competitive intermediaries. In a similar fashion, a need for consoli-
dation existed for non-bank financial institutions. Different mergers and closures 
already occurred but the process of restructuring is not yet finished – not least because 
various Korean corporations (among them large jaebol like Daewoo) still have serious 
financial problems). Among foreign banks with a bad-loan-problem in autumn 1997 or 
foreign banks that ran into bad-loan-problems after the outbreak of the financial crisis 
(when even various competitive Korean companies went bankrupt), funds from their 
foreign head-office guaranteed solvency, and thus no danger for financial instability 
arose.  
Of course, international banks' generous flow of funds to South Korea was excessive 
and growing economic problems were ignored far too long. However, two kinds of 
foreign lending have to be separated here. On the one side, there are funds offered by 
foreign banks that operate within the country (through branches in South Korea) – these 
funds were allocated directly to specific customers by these foreign banks. On the other 
side, foreign funds exist which are borrowed by domestic (Korean) banks and com-
panies from foreign banks or other creditors that are located abroad – this kind of 
lending belongs to international financial markets. It was the latter of these two kinds of 
foreign lending which characterized South Korea's increasing debt overload. So it is 
noteworthy that before the crisis for almost a decade foreign banks' importance in 




debt of South Korea increased. That this was detrimental for South Korea can be seen in 
the fact – shown in section III d – that credit allocation of foreign banks' branches was 
more efficient than those of domestic banks. Consequently, the main conclusion for 
development policy is that it is wiser to integrate foreign banks into a country with a 
regulated and, thus less competitive financial system (like in South Korea) and let 
foreign banks allocate funds directly to final customers through their own branches 
rather than letting domestic banks attract these funds in international markets and 
allocate them.  
Altogether, this study can increase the knowledge about the potential outcomes of 
integrating foreign banks into a developing country's or newly industrialized country's 
financial system that is – despite various deregulations – still used by the government 
for industrial policy. It can be seen that in this environment foreign banks are able to 
implement a more efficient intermediation than domestic banks. Nevertheless, without a 
less regulated environment competition remains limited and domestic banks have 
therefore no real incentive or pressure to become more efficient. However, there are 
also limitations: Firstly, only some – but major – aspects of foreign banks' business 
were investigated and only a limited time horizon has been used. Secondly, the case of 
South Korea can only serve as an example for a country that experienced foreign banks' 
business in an environment of – despite the recent crisis – dynamic growth (that might 
have been promoted but, of course, was not entirely caused by foreign banks' presence 
and international finance). It will remain unclear what happens when economic growth 
is weak – as in various African and Latin American countries – and what would happen 
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